During my time living on the southern border of Mexico, I have met many conscientious local people who harbor a deep concern for the situation of Central American and other migrants who travel across the length of Mexico, headed towards the United States. These individuals talk about the extortion and abuse of migrants that are common practice among gangs, immigration officials, and local police. They are pointedly critical of the corruption among Mexican officials that deal with migrants as well as the actions (and inaction, in many cases) of the Mexican government with regards to the situation of migrants. They point out that, although it’s difficult to cross the northern border with the United States, with gangs running rampant, intimidation and abuse by the Border Patrol, and the high environmental risks of the desert, at least when you get past the border you are relatively free to live your life without fear of being pursued by immigration officials or local police (however, I do think it’s necessary to note that this situation has been changing in the U.S. with increased raids and local-level immigration enforcement efforts). The largest dangers, these Mexican friends say, lie in Mexico –where immigration agents pursue migrants throughout the entire territory of the country, forcing them to hide during the entire trip, thereby increasing their vulnerability to the slew of dangers they face along the way.
While it is important to challenge the Mexican government and authorities in these aspects of their actions (and inactions) towards migrants in the country’s territory, it is also important that the U.S. not be “let off the hook.” A closer look at the roots of Mexican immigration policies and diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Mexico reveals that the U.S. has actually played a notable role in contributing to the severity of the situation for undocumented migrants that we see in Mexico today. As a U.S. citizen with a potential voice in changing the actions of my country, I have been particularly interested in researching and understanding this role. In general, I’ve found that the manifestations of the influence fall into four main categories. These are: (1) pressure by the United States on the Mexican government to increase enforcement, (2) direct funding and support of immigration enforcement programs, (3) funding from the United States for Mexican law enforcement, military, and intelligence and (4) the ripple effect of restrictive U.S. national immigration policy. After providing a brief introduction to the recent history of immigration enforcement in Mexico, I take up each of these four categories in turn. I then provide recommendations of demands that can be made of the U.S. government in order to decrease the vulnerability of migrants who transit across Mexico.
In recent years, Mexico has experienced a significant build-up in its immigration enforcement, particularly along its southern border. Up until the 1990s, control in the southern border region of Mexico was lax. In fact, in the 1980s, the Mexican government purposely chose not to strongly enforce the southern border in order to facilitate the continuance of the long history of cross-border economy and family ties (Castillo 2006, 4). Nevertheless, in the 1990s, additional control operations and mechanisms, such as highway checkpoints, were implemented (Castillo 2006, 5). Then, in July 2001, came the major ramping up of southern border enforcement – Vicente Fox’s Plan Sur. Hundreds of new agents were deployed, additional road blocks and control stations were created, strategic “belts” of enforcement were established, and an increased involvement of the military in interdiction efforts was laid out (Flynn, 4). Along with increased enforcement, a steady increase in the number of deportations performed by the Mexican immigration authorities can be seen from 2002 through 2005. (Martínez, 11). In 2004, Mexican immigration authorities deported 204,113 people from Central America, approximately 50% of the estimated number of people who attempted to cross undocumented that same year (Martínez, 5). This increased enforcement has important implications for the well-being of migrants. As was mentioned above and can be seen in other historical examples such as Operation Gatekeeper in the U.S., increased immigration and border enforcement has been linked with increased human rights abuses and risks for migrants.
Although Mexican authorities generally claim that their border enforcement changes have been implemented for the country’s own interests (Revelli, 3), there are a number of factors that signal a strong influence of the United States government in the policies (and on the resulting conditions faced by migrants in Mexican territory). One way this influence has been exerted is through diplomatic pressure on the part of United States. Before the implementation of Plan Sur, the U.S. and Mexican governments had been in talks about the migration situation. During these talks, the U.S. consistently showed its interest in enforcing its border and decreasing the number of undocumented immigrants entering the country. Many experts see Fox’s Plan Sur as a diplomatic effort to sway the United States government into regularizing the status of undocumented Mexican workers in the country (Revelli, 2).
Another example of the U.S. government’s exertion of diplomatic pressure for increased migration control is the Puebla Process. This term refers to the actions initiated by the annual Regional Conference on Migration (RCM) begun in 1996. This conference of Central and North American countries began meeting to provide a forum for discussing coordinated responses to migration in the regions. While initially convened with the primary aim of developing programs to protect the human rights of migrants, a marked change in the goals of the conference can be seen in their meeting in March 2002. This was the first meeting of the conference after the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center in the United States, an event that is often cited as a “turning point” in U.S. immigration policy. After September 11th, the U.S. government took a much more aggressive stance against undocumented immigration, with the justification that combating this type of immigration was important for protecting the country from future acts of terrorism. In the 2002 meeting of the conference, the United States made this new priority clear, and used its diplomatic power to steer the agenda of the conference towards new priorities: national security and the fight against terrorism (Castillo 2003, 5). It is hard to know exactly how this shifting of priorities has influenced specific actions of the participating countries, because most of the meetings of the RCM occur behind closed doors. However, it can be assumed that, through the imposition of its own redefined priorities on the conference, the United States has pressured Mexican and Central American countries into shifting towards these new priorities as well, and away from the focus on human rights protections.
In addition to diplomatic pressure, the United States has also influenced migration enforcement in Mexico through direct interventions. Most of these interventions have come in the form of funding for Mexican immigration efforts. For example, with the surge in Central American migration towards the U.S. after Hurricane Mitch, the U.S. government provided direct funding to pay for buses that were used to transport migrants who were captured and detained in Mexico back to their home countries (Flynn, 3).
In recent years, U.S. funding has also been channeled into Mexican law enforcement, military, and intelligence. Although the connection with migration may not seem obvious at first, this intervention most likely has and will continue to have important effects on the experience of migrants crossing Mexico. As mentioned above, Mexican police and military officials are often guilty of committing abuses against migrants. Overstepping authority to detain migrants, physical abuses, and extortion all appear in local reports of human rights abuses in Mexico. This is not incredibly surprising when one considers that corruption is a major issue in the police and military systems of Mexico. Although the United States is certainly aware of this notorious corruption, they are currently providing aid to these agencies.
This type of U.S. intervention in Mexico is clearly seen in the recently approved Plan Mérida. This bill, approved by the U.S. Congress at the end of 2007, provides 1.4 billion dollars of security to Mexico and Central America. This funding is directed towards goals such as police training, the purchase of surveillance and inspection equipment, improved technology, counterterrorism work, and the creation of a database on immigrants (Carlsen, 3). There is a notable absence of any funding earmarked for specific programs that work to combat corruption or towards the diminishment of human rights abuses within the agencies. In providing increased aid to military and police institutions without making any clear effort to combat corruption and abuse of authority, this aid will only serve to exacerbate the problems of abuse and extortion that migrants already face from corrupt officials in Mexico.
A fourth manner through which the United States is influencing the treatment and experience of migrants in Mexico is through its own restrictive national immigration policies. It is currently very difficult for a person from a developing country to obtain legal permission to enter the United States. Some people interested in immigrating to the U.S. are able to obtain tourist or student visas that allow them to be in the country legally for a short period of time, and then simply overstay their visa (at which point they become an “undocumented” immigrant). Others are able to obtain H-2 temporary worker visas, and skilled, educated workers can obtain visas to work in their area of expertise. Still others are able to obtain visas through the family reunification program. However, all of these visas, particularly for temporary workers and family reunification, are very limited. Due to a large backlog in processing requests, even individuals who clearly qualify for the programs generally have to wait a minimum of five years to have their request considered.
Many others, who don’t fit into any of the above categories, don’t have any feasible pathway to enter the country legally. Nevertheless, many people still feel forced to migrate due to harsh conditions of poverty in home communities, and the possibility of comparatively well-remunerated work in the U.S. Due to this necessity, combined with the lack of legal alternatives, many individuals feel that they have no other choice than to migrate in an undocumented fashion towards the U.S. Without papers to enter the U.S. legally, they cannot fly there directly or obtain a Mexican transmigrant visa to cross Mexico legally. Instead, most of these migrants cross Mexico undocumented as well. The restrictiveness of U.S. immigration policy and the backlogs in their legal methods of entry can therefore be seen as a major factor in the fact that undocumented migrants end up in Mexico and suffer the vulnerability that goes along with their undocumented condition.
After reviewing these aspects of the effects of United States policies and actions on the experience for undocumented migrants crossing Mexico, it is clear that the conditions of vulnerability and the threats that migrants suffer in the country are not wholly “Mexico’s problem.” These problems have clear roots in United States policy and the U.S. should be held accountable for this influence. While agencies of Mexico should certainly take measures to reduce abuses and violations against migrants, there is a clear role that the U.S. could play in combating these problems as well. Comprehensive immigration reform that provides feasible pathways of legal entry for workers, elimination of the backlog in the current visa programs, and a shift towards migration enforcement policies that prioritize the human rights protections of migrants could all lead to significant improvements in the situation of migrants and their families. The assumption of a stance of collaboration within the Puebla Process that honors the national sovereignty of participating nations and avoids unilateral diplomatic pressure also could lead to significant advances. Lastly, the reduction of U.S. security aid to Mexico, or the redirection of that aid to programs that focus on corruption-reduction and human rights preservation could significantly reduce the incidence (or at least avoid an increase) of abuses carried out by members of the Mexican police and military. There are many points of entry that can be taken in order to begin fighting against the harsh conditions that undocumented migrants experience while crossing Mexican territory. For U.S. citizens, advocating for changes within their own government’s policies is an important option within the fight.
References:
Carlsen, Laura. A Primer on Plan Mexico, The Narco News Bulletin, May 26, 2008.
Castillo, Manuel Angel (2006). “Mexico: Caught Between the United States and Central
America.” April 2006. Migration Information Source
Castillo, M.A. & R. Corona Vásquez (2003), Los centroamericanos en los Estados
Unidos: tendencias y patrones recientes, Estudios Centroamericanos, no. 669
670: 685-694.
Flynn, Michael. “U.S. Anti-Migration Efforts Move South.” July 8, 2002. Americas
Program: A New World of Analysis, Ideas and Policy Options
Martínez, G. (2008), “Inmigración en la Frontera Sur de México”, presentación para el
diplomado en Estudios Migratorios en la Frontera Sur de México, sesión 12, El
Colegio de la Frontera Sur, Tapachula.
Revelli, Philippe. “Mexico, devourer of migrants.” July 2003. Le Monde Diplomatique
